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Abstract
We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the Italian
lending market. We show that banks’ optimal price response to an increase in adverse selection varies
with competition. Exploiting matched data on loans and defaults, we estimate models of demand for
credit, loan use, pricing, and firm default. We find evidence of adverse selection and evaluate its im-
portance. While indeed prices rise in competitive markets and decline in concentrated ones, the former
effect dominates, suggesting that while market power can mitigate the adverse effects of asymmetric
information, mainstream concerns about its effects survive with imperfect competition.
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1 Introduction
Following the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a large theoretical liter-
ature has stressed the key role of asymmetric information in financial markets. This literature has shown
that asymmetric information can generate market failures such as credit rationing, inefficient provision, mis-
spricing of risk and, in the limit, market breakdown.1 Indeed, the recent financial crisis can be seen as an
extreme manifestation of the problems that asymmetric information can cause. In fact, following the defi-
nition by Mishkin (2012), a financial crisis is a nonlinear disruption to financial markets in which adverse
selection and moral hazard problems become much worse. Deepening our understanding of the extent and
causes of asymmetric information is key for the design of a regulatory framework that limits their negative
consequences.
Although the basic theoretical issues are well understood, empirical work is fairly rare. Asymmetric infor-
mation is by definition hard to measure. If a financial intermediary, such as a lender, has an information dis-
advantage with respect to a potential borrower, it is very unlikely that such a disadvantage can be overcome
by the researcher. While one cannot generally construct measures of the ex-ante unobserved characteristics
determining riskiness, it is often possible to observe ex-post outcomes, such as defaulting on a loan. The
empirical literature has been built on these facts, analyzing how agents with different ex-post outcomes self
select ex-ante into contracts (if any) with different characteristics in terms of price, coverage, deductibles
etc. (Chiappori and Salanié (2000), Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman and Pinquet (2003), Lustig (2011), Einav,
Jenkins and Levin (2012), Starc (2014)).2
We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the Italian market
for small business lines of credit. We exploit detailed, proprietary data on a representative sample of Italian
firms, the population of medium and large Italian banks, individual lines of credit between them, and sub-
sequent individual defaults. While our data include a measure of observable credit risk comparable to that
available to a bank during the application process, in our model we allow firms to have private information
about the underlying riskiness of the project they seek to finance. The market is characterized by adverse
selection if riskier firms are more likely to demand credit. As shown by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), in this
setting an increase in the interest rate exacerbates adverse selection, inducing a deterioration in the quality of
the pool of borrowers. We formulate and structurally estimate a model of credit demand, loan use, default,
and bank pricing based on the insights in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Einav et al. (2012) that allows us to
estimate the extent of adverse selection in the market, and to run counterfactuals that approximate economic
environments of likely concern to policymakers.
One key contribution of our paper is that we study adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive market.
This differs from most of the previous literature, that, due to data limitation or to specific market features,
has assumed either perfectly competitive markets, or imperfectly competitive markets subject to significant
regulatory oversight. Assuming perfect competition in the market for small business loans is not desirable,
1See, for example, Banerjee and Newman (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1990), DeMeza and Webb (1987), Gale (1990),
Hubbard (1998), Mankiw (1986), Mookherjee and Ray (2002).
2 See Einav and Finkelstein (2011), Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010), and Chiappori and Salanié (2013) for extensive surveys
of the this literature.
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given the local nature of small business lending and the high degree of market concentration at the local
level, the latter due to entry barriers in the Italian banking sectors that persisted into the 1990s. We show
that the degree of competition can have significant consequences on the equilibrium effects of asymmetric
information. Intuitively, with perfect competition banks price at average costs (e.g. Einav and Finkelstein
(2011)). When adverse selection increases, the price also rises, as a riskier pool of borrowers implies higher
average costs in the form of more defaults. When banks exert market power, however, greater adverse
selection can lower prices, as it implies a riskier pool of borrowers at any given price, lowering infra marginal
benefits of price increases in the standard (e.g. monopoly) pricing calculus. As a consequence, a bank
with market power facing an increase in adverse selection will also increase its market share and improve
the quality of its borrowers, as a lower price attracts marginal borrowers, which are safer under adverse
selection. This implies both that imperfect competition can moderate the welfare losses from an increase
in adverse selection and that higher adverse selection can moderate the welfare losses of market power.
Mahoney and Weyl (2014) provide an intuitive theoretical foundation for this result.3
To analyze these questions, we construct a model where banks offer standardized contracts to observationally
equivalent firms. Loan contracts are differentiated products in terms of, among other characteristics, the
amount granted, a bank’s network of branches, the years a bank has been in a market, and distance from
the closest branch. Banks compete Bertrand-Nash on interest rates, which also act as a screening device
as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Firms seek lines of credit to finance the ongoing activities associated with
a particular business project, the riskiness of which is private information to the firm. Firms choose the
preferred loan, if any, according to a mixed logit demand system. They also choose how much of the credit
line to use. Finally, they decide if to repay the loan or default. The degree of adverse selection is determined
by two correlations: that between the unobservable determinants of the choice to take up a loan and default
(the extensive margin) and that between unobserved determinants of how much of that loan to use and
default (the intensive margin). For a given interest rate, firms’ expected profits are increasing with risk due
to the insurance effect of loans: banks share a portion of the costs of unsuccessful projects. As a result,
higher-risk firms are more willing to demand higher-rate loans. This, in turn, influences the profitability of
rate increases by banks.4 We show with a Monte Carlo simulation that imperfect competition can indeed
mitigate the effects of an increase in adverse selection.5 The effects of asymmetric information on prices
depends on market power. When markets are competitive, more adverse selection always leads to higher
rates and less credit. As banks’ market power increases, this relationship becomes weaker and eventually
turns negative.
We estimate the model on highly detailed microdata covering individual loans between firms and banks
between 1988 and 1998. There are two key elements of this data. The first, from the Italian Central Credit
3 They show in Proposition 4 and corresponding Figure 7 that when a monopolist’s market share is high, with respect to the
outside option, an increase in adverse selection drives prices down and quantities up.
4 Handel (2013), Lustig (2011), and Starc (2014) find similar effects of adverse selection and imperfect competition in US health
insurance markets. Each of these focuses on the price-reducing effect of asymmetric information in the presence of imperfect
competition. None articulates the non-monotonicity of these effects depending on the strength of competition, an empirically
relevant result in our application.
5 In the Monte Carlo we vary the degree of competition changing the number of banks in the market, as well as varying the
price sensitivity of borrowers, which increases/decreases their utility from the outside option of not borrowing.
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Register (Centrale dei Rischi), provides detailed information on all individual loans extended by the 90
largest Italian banks (which account for 80% of the loan market), including the identity of the borrower
and interest rate charged. It also reports whether the firm subsequently defaulted. The second, from the
Centrale dei Bilanci database, provides detailed information on borrowers’ balance sheets. Critically, this
second dataset includes an observable measure of each firm’s default risk (SCORE). Combining them yields
a matched panel dataset of borrowers and lenders. While the data span a 11-year period and most firms
in the data take out multiple loans, in our empirical analysis we only use the first year of each firm’s main
line of credit. This avoids the need to model the dynamics of firm-bank relationships and the inferences
available to subsequent lenders of existing lines of credit.6 We define local markets at the level of provinces,
administrative units roughly comparable to a US county that, as discussed in detail by Guiso, Pistaferri and
Schivardi (2013), constitute a natural geographical unit for small business lending. We estimate individual
firms’ demand for credit, banks’ pricing of these lines, firm’s loan use and subsequent default. We extend the
econometric approach taken by Einav et al. (2012) to the case of multiple lenders by assuming unobserved
tastes for credit independent of the specific bank chosen to supply that credit. We combine this framework
with the literature on demand estimation for differentiated products (Berry 1994, Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes 1995, Goolsbee and Petrin 2004). Data on default, loan use, demand, and pricing separately identify
the distribution of private riskiness from heterogeneous firm disutility from paying interest.
We provide reduced form evidence of adverse selection along both the intensive and the extensive margin.
For the former, we run a positive correlation test as in Chiappori and Salanié (2000). For the latter, we
estimate a Heckman selection model. In the structural model, we find that the choice to borrow, the amount
used and the decision to default depend on observables as expected. In particular, a higher interest rate
and higher distance from branches reduce the probability that a firm borrows. Among other observables,
firms with more cash flow are both less likely to demand credit, arguably because they have more internally
generated funds, use a smaller share of their loan, and less likely to default. In terms of correlation of
unobservables, we find a positive correlation both between the choice to borrow and default, and between
how much loan to use and default. We interpret this as evidence of adverse selection.
We run a counterfactual to quantify the extent of adverse selection and understand its interaction with im-
perfect competition. In this policy experiment we increase the degree of adverse selection, identified by
the correlation between both demand and default and loan use and default unobservables, and look at how
equilibrium prices, demand, and defaults vary in response to this. The economic motivation for this exercise
can be thought as the possible consequences of a credit crunch, where risky firms become more exposed
to financial distress than safe ones and demand more credit. This counterfactual delivers two important
findings. First, equilibrium prices, market shares, and defaults both increase and decrease in response to an
increase in adverse selection. Second, these variations are correlated with banks’ market power, measured
by their estimated markup at the year-province level. We find that banks with higher markups decrease
prices as adverse selection increases, and consequently increase their share of borrowers and decrease their
share of defaulters. This implies that banks with higher markups have a counter-cyclical effect on credit
supply, responding to an increase in adverse selection with a reduction in prices and an increase in quantity
6 A similar approach is followed, among others, by Chiappori and Salanié (2000). We model the dynamics of firm-bank
relationships in a companion paper (Pavanini and Schivardi (2014)).
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lent. We show that one standard deviation increase in markup reduces a bank’s prices by 3.7%, increases its
market shares by 13.8%, and reduces its share of defaulters by 2.4 percentage points.
This paper contributes to two main strands of empirical work. The first is the literature on empirical models
of asymmetric information, so far mainly focussed on insurance markets. We look at the less developed area
of credit markets, where the most recent applications have followed both experimental (Karlan and Zinman
(2009)) and structural (Einav et al. (2012)) approaches. Our novelty is to introduce imperfect competition.
We show that this is important, as the impact of asymmetric information depends crucially on the nature
of competition in the market. The second field we contribute to is the literature on empirical banking,
where we are not aware of any structural model that seeks to measure the consequences of asymmetric
information and the role competition plays in mediating its effects. Nonetheless, several reduced form papers
on Italian banking provide motivation for a model that structurally combines these two effects. For example,
Bofondi and Gobbi (2006) show that new banks entering local markets experience higher default rates
than incumbents, as the latter have superior information about borrowers and local economic conditions.
Gobbi and Lotti (2004) claim that there is a positive correlation between branching and markets with low
proprietary information services, and that interest rate spreads are positively related to entry of de novo
banks, but not of banks existing in other markets. Finally, Panetta, Schivardi and Shum (2009) show that
mergers enhance pricing of observable risk, as merged banks achieve a better match of interest rates and
default risk, mainly due to better information processing.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we describe the dataset and the market, in Section 3
we present the reduced form tests of adverse selection, Section 4 outlines the structural model, and Section
5 describes the econometric specification of demand, loan use, default and supply. The estimation and the
results are in Section 6, the counterfactuals are in Section 7, Section 8 concludes.
2 Data and Institutional Details
We use a unique dataset of small business credit lines, previously used in Panetta et al. (2009).7 It is based on
three main sources of data. Interest rate data and data on outstanding loans are from the Italian Centrale dei
Rischi, or Central Credit Register. Firm-level balance sheet data are from the Centrale dei Bilanci database.
Banks’ balance-sheet and income-statement data are from the Banking Supervision Register at the Bank of
Italy. By combining these data, we obtain a matched panel dataset of borrowers and lenders extending over
an eleven-year period, between 1988 and 1998. We also collected data on bank branches at the local level
since 1959.8
The Central Credit Register (hereafter CR) is a database that contains detailed information on individual
bank loans extended by Italian banks. Banks must report data at the individual borrower level on the amount
granted and effectively utilized for all loans exceeding a given threshold,9 with a breakdown by type of
7For reasons that will be explained below, in this paper we only use on a subset of the original data. This section focusses on
the description of this subset, referring the interested reader to Panetta et al. (2009) for descriptive statistics of the full dataset.
8 Detailed descriptives on the branch data are in Ciari and Pavanini (2014).
9 The threshold was 41,000 euros (U.S. $42,000) until December 1995 and 75,000 euros thereafter.
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the loan (credit lines, financial and commercial paper, collateralized loans, medium and long-term loans
and personal guarantees). Banks also report if they classify a loan as bad, meaning that they attach a low
probability to the event that the firm will be able to repay the loan in full. We define a default as a loan
being classified as bad.10 In addition, a subgroup of around 90 banks (accounting for more than 80 percent
of total bank lending) have agreed to file detailed information on the interest rates they charge to individual
borrowers on each type of loan.
We restrict our attention to short-term credit lines, which have ideal features for our analysis. First, the bank
can change the interest rate at any time, while the borrower can close the credit line without notice. This
means that differences between the interest rates on loans are not influenced by differences in the maturity
of the loan. Second, the loan contracts included in the CR are homogeneous products, so that they can be
meaningfully compared across banks and firms. Third, they are not collateralized, a key feature for our
analysis, as adverse selection issues become less relevant for collateralized borrowing. Fourth, short term
bank loans are the main source of borrowing of Italian firms. For example, in 1994 they represented 53
percent of the total debts according to the Flow of Funds data. We define the interest rate as the ratio of the
payment made in each year by the firm to the bank to the average amount of the loan. The interest payment
includes the fixed expenses charged by the bank to the firm (e.g. which encompass the cost of opening the
credit line or the cost of mailing the loan statement).
We focus on a subsample of the available data, namely on the main credit line of the first year a firm opens
at least one credit line. Considering only the first year is a common assumption in static empirical models of
insurance with asymmetric information, starting from Chiappori and Salanié (2000). This is done to avoid
modeling heterogenous experience ratings among borrowers and loan renegotiation, challenging topics, and
ones that we leave for future research. Moreover, we focus on the main new credit line because it accounts
on average for around 75% of the total share of new yearly credit (both usable and used),11 even if in Italy
multiple relationship banking is widely used by firms to reduce liquidity risk (Detragiache, Garella and
Guiso (2000)). This means that we restrict our attention only to the first year in which we observe a firm
in our data.12 This reduces the sample size from around 90,000 firms to over 40,000.13 Table 1, Panel A
reports the loan level information that we use in the empirical analysis. Out of around 20,000 firms, 26%
take up a loan in our sample period, and use on average 76% of the amount granted. Of these, around 16%
end up being classified as bad loans within our sample.14 The average amount granted is 224,000 euros, and
the average interest rate charged is just below 15%.
Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the 90 reporting banks. The average total asset level is
almost 11 billion, they employ 3,200 employees and have a share of bad loans over total loans of 6%. The
10 We do not observe if a loan actually reverts to not being bad. However, this seems to be a rather unlikely event. Moreover,
classifying a loan as bad has a negative impact on bank accounting ratios, even before the firm formally defaults. So this is clearly
a costly event in itself for the bank.
11 The main line is defined as the line for which the amount used, regardless of the amount granted, is the highest. For cases in
which multiple lines have the same amount used, then the one with the lowest price is chosen.
12 To avoid left censoring issues we drop the first year of our sample (1988) and just look at new relationships starting from 1989.
13 Due to computational constraints, we are able to estimate the model only on half of the sample. Therefore we randomly pick
50% of the province-year combinations in our sample.
14 We classify a borrower as defaulter when any of its loans is past due even in the years after the initial borrowing date, at most
up to 2001.
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average bank is present in 34 provinces out of 95, but with great variation across banks.
The Centrale dei Bilanci (hereafter CB) collects yearly data on the balance sheets and income statements
of a sample of about 35,000 Italian non-financial and non-agricultural firms. This information is collected
and standardized by the CB, that sells these data to banks for their lending decisions. The unique feature of
the CB data set is that, unlike other widely used data sets on individual companies (such as the Compustat
database of US companies), it has wide coverage of small and medium enterprises; moreover, almost all the
companies in the CB sample are unlisted. The coverage of these small firms makes the data set particularly
well suited for our analysis, because informational asymmetries are potentially strongest for these firms.
Initially, data were collected by banks themselves and transmitted to the CB. In time, the CB has increased
the sample size drawing from balance sheets deposited with the chambers of commerce (limited liability
companies are obliged to file their balance sheets to the chambers of commerce, that make them available
to the public). The database is fairly representative of the Italian non-financial sector. The firms in the CB
sample represent about 49.4% of the total sales reported in the national accounting data for the Italian non-
financial, non-agricultural sector. In addition to collecting the data, the CB computes an indicator of the risk
profile of each firm, which we refer to in the remainder of this paper as the SCORE. The SCORE represents
our measure of a firm’s observable default risk. It takes values from 1 to 9 and is computed annually
using discriminant analysis based on a series of balance sheet indicators (assets, rate of return, debts etc.)
according to the methodology described in Altman (1968) and Altman, Marco and Varetto (1994).
We define a borrowing firm as one that shows up as a borrower in the CR database. Non borrowing firms
are defined according to two criteria: they are not in the CR database and report zero bank borrowing
in their balance sheets. We use the second definition to exclude firms that are not in our CR database
but are still borrowing from banks, either from one of the non-reporting banks or through different loan
contracts.15 Table 1, Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the sample of borrowing and non-borrowing
firms. These two groups of firms appear to be fairly similar, except that borrowing firms seems to have more
fixed assets and be slightly younger on average. In terms of bank relations, borrowing firms have on average
around 3.5 credit lines active every year. They open one new line every year and close 0.6. Note that these
firms are mostly new borrowers, so they are more likely to be in the process of expanding their number of
relationships. The share of credit used from the main line is around 70%, and it goes up to 73% when a firm
borrows for the first year. This shows that focusing on the main line captures most of the credit that firms
borrow, especially for new firms.
There is ample evidence that firms, particularly small businesses like the ones in our sample, are tied to
their local credit markets. For instance, Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) show
that lending to small businesses is a highly localized activity as proximity between borrowers and lenders
facilitates information acquisition. Segmentation of local credit markets is thus very likely to occur. In our
market definition we will use provinces as our geographical units. Provinces are administrative unit roughly
comparable to a US county. They are a proper measure of local markets in banking for at least three reasons.
First, this was the definition of a local market used by the Bank of Italy to decide whether to authorize the
15 This implies that we exclude from our sample around 27,000 firms that borrow from banks not included in our sample, or
borrow from the banks in our sample but using a different type of loan. This might be a possible source of selection bias that we
will need to investigate.
7
opening of new branches when entry was regulated. Second, according to the Italian Antitrust authority
the ”relevant market” in banking for antitrust purposes is the province. Third, the bankers’ rule of thumb
is to avoid lending to a client located at more than 1.4 (Degryse and Ongena (2005)) or 4 (Petersen and
Rajan (2002)) miles from the branch. In our data firms are on average 2.77 km (1.72 miles) far from the
branch of their main bank. At the time of our data, there were 95 provinces. We report summary statistics
of markets (defined more precisely below) in Panel D of Table 1, which shows that there are around 5 banks
per province-year in our sub-sample, each bank has on average almost 22 branches per province, with a
market share of 8% for branches and 6% for loans.16 On average a bank has been in a province for at least
23 years.17
16 The market share of the outside option, defined by the firms that choose not to borrow, is on average around 70%.
17 We start counting the years from 1959, which is the first year that we observe in the branching data.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Demand 19,310 0.26 0.44
Loan Level Loan Use 4,931 0.76 1.04
Default 4,931 0.16 0.36
Amount Granted 4,931 224.62 102.26
Interest Rate 4,931 14.69 3.77
Panel B: Total Assets 900 10,726.8 16,965.6
Bank Level Employees 896 3,179.9 4,582.5
Bad Loans 893 6.2 6.3
Number of Provinces 861 34.54 30.19
Panel C: Borrowing Firms Non-Borrowing Firms
Firm Level Fixed Assets 4,931 2,552.54 19,574.37 14,379 1,601.40 7,928.75
Intangible/Tot Assets 4,931 0.18 0.24 14,379 0.20 0.27
Net Worth 4,931 1,515.94 12,424.67 14,379 1,662.28 7,490.49
Trade Debit 4,931 1,220.20 2,944.04 14,379 1,501.95 8,634.86
Profits 4,931 716.91 1,916.76 14,379 550.72 2,986.30
Cash Flow 4,931 407.09 1,564.90 14,379 494.72 2,590.04
Firm’s Age 4,931 11.77 12.00 14,379 14.17 13.74
Branch distance (km) 4,931 2.77 6.65
Number of Lenders 21,876 3.49 2.42
Lines Opened 21,876 1.06 1.56
Lines Closed 21,876 0.64 1.26
Share of Main Line 18,606 0.70 0.26
Share of Main New Line 4,182 0.73 0.25
Panel D: Number of Banks 396 5.02 3.97
Market level Number of Branches 1,989 21.91 34.03
Share of Branches 1,989 0.08 0.09
Years in Market 1,989 23.23 13.47
Market Shares 1,989 0.06 0.07
Note: In Panel A an observation is a firm for the first variable and a loan contract for the others. Demand is a dummy for taking a
loan or not, loan use is the share of amount used over granted, default is a dummy for a firm having any of its loans classified as bad
anytime up to 2001, amount granted is in thousands of euros. In Panel B an observation is a bank-year. Employees is the number of
employees at the end of the year. Bad loans is a percentage of total loans. In Panel C an observation is a firm for the first 8 variables
and a firm-year for the others. The balance sheet variables in this panel are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The SCORE
is the indicator of the risk of the firm computed each year by the CB (higher values indicate riskier companies). Number of lenders
is the number of banks from which the firm borrows through these credit lines. The last two variables represent the ratio of credit
utilized from the main line over total credit utilized, when credit utilized is non-zero. In Panel D an observation is year-province for
the number of banks, and bank-year-province for the other variables. Number and share of branches are per bank-province-year,
years in market are the number of years a bank has been in a province for since 1959. Market shares are in terms of loans.
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3 Reduced Form Evidence
We conduct some reduced form analysis to test for evidence of asymmetric information and to justify the
use of a structural model. To do so we follow the early empirical literature on positive correlation tests
introduced by Chiappori and Salanié (2000). We propose two tests, one based on the choice to take up a
loan and another based on the choice of how much to draw on the credit line. Both tests are based on the
correlation between the unobservables driving these choices and the unobservables influencing default. The
choice of these tests gives a flavor of the identification strategy that we will rely on in the structural model,
explained in Section 4. We run these tests on the whole sample and for the first loan ever taken, the set of
loans that we will use in the structural estimates.
3.1 Demand and Default
We start by investigating whether firms that are more likely to demand credit are also more likely to default.
The CB dataset includes both firms borrowing and not borrowing, while we only observe default on the loan
for borrowing firms. We can formalize the problem as a two equations selection model:
di = 1(Xdi β + νi > 0)
fi = 1(Xfi γ + ηi > 0)
(1)
where di is equal to 1 if the firm borrows and fi is equal to one if the borrower defaults.18 fi is observed
only if di = 1. This is similar to the classical selection model analyzed by Heckman (1979), with the only
difference that the outcome variable is also binary, rather than being continuous. Adverse selection implies
that the correlation between ν and η is positive. If we estimate a linear probability model for default,
assuming that ν, η are bivariate normal with correlation coefficient ρ, we can employ the two step procedure
of Heckman (1979) by first estimating a probit on di, and then constructing the Mills ratio and inserting it in
the second equation. A test for a positive correlation between the error terms is a t-test on the coefficient of
the Mills ratio in the default equation. As controls in the default equation we use firm level characteristics
(total assets, share of intangible assets over total assets, returns on assets, leverage, sales, trade debit, score)
as well as sector, year and area dummies. In the selection equation we add as instruments indicators of local
financial development in 1936 at the regional level. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) show that these
are good instruments for financial development today and uncorrelated with current economic performance.
They therefore satisfy the condition for a valid exclusion restriction: they affect the probability of obtaining
a loan, which varies with the degree of local financial development, but are unlikely to be correlated with
the probability of defaulting, conditional on having a loan.19
Results reported in Table 2, Panel A, are consistent with the hypothesis that lending is affected by adverse
selection. The coefficient of the Mills ratio is positive and statistically significant both when considering
first loans and all loans. The magnitude is larger for the second sample, implying that adverse selection
18 As explained in the data section, we define a firm as defaulter if any of its loans are classified as bad up to at most 2001.
19 This instrument is valid for this simplified setup of the reduced form test, where it controls for selection bias, but not for the
structural model that we present later, where we need to instrument interest rates that vary at the bank-market-year level.
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issues may not only be confined to the early phase of the firm’s borrowing cycle. These results suggest that
investigating the consequences of adverse selection over the duration of a borrower-lender relationship is a
promising topic for further study.
3.2 Loan Use and Default
We then consider the relationship between loan use and default. Differently from the previous subsection,
we are not in a selection framework as the same firms are observed in both equations. Still, the idea is the
same, as we test for a positive correlation between the unobservables that determine the choice of “coverage”
(loan use) and the occurrence of an “accident” (default), conditional on several individual characteristics.
We consider two dependent variables for loan use: the absolute amount of credit used as well as the amount
of credit used as a share of credit granted. In our lending context we check if firms that use a larger share
of their loans are more likely to default on them. Adverse selection should imply that riskier firms use more
credit. We set up the following bivariate probit:
`i = 1(Xiβ + εi > 0)
fi = 1(Xiγ + ηi > 0)
(2)
where `i is a dummy equal to one if the amount of loan used is above the median, or if the amount of loan
used over granted is above the median, and fi takes value of one if the borrower is a defaulter. The vector
of controls Xi is composed of year, area, sector, and bank fixed effects, firms’ balance sheet variables,
the score, and the interest rate. We specify the distribution of the residuals εi, ηi as joint normal, with a
correlation coefficient ρ. Positive and significant ρ suggests the presence of adverse selection. The results
of this test are summarized in Table 2 Panel B. The positive correlation is similar for the sample of first
loans and for all loans and for both dependent variables. Again, this evidence is consistent with adverse
selection.
Based on these suggestive results, we estimate a structural model to measure the extent of adverse selection
in this market and its consequences for market outcomes. The structural framework has several advantages
compared to these reduced form tests. First, it has a more flexible residuals’ correlation structure that allows
us to estimate them jointly. Second, it controls appropriately for endogeneity of prices. Third, we can use
it to run counterfactual policy experiments to measure the consequences of adverse selection. We introduce
this model next.
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Table 2: Positive Correlation Tests
Panel A: Demand and Default
First All
Selection .131∗∗ .312∗∗∗
(.059) (.023)
Panel B: Loan Use and Default
First All
Used 0.181∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Used/Granted 0.196∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Note: Panel A reports the selection term of a Heckman selection model, that is the correlation coefficient of the
demand and default residuals. The two columns report the coefficient on the Mills ratio in a model where the outcome
equation (default or not) is linear. Panel B reports the correlation coefficient of the error terms of a bivariate probit
model. Columns labelled “First” only consider the first loan ever, “All” all loans.
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4 The Model
The framework we construct aims at quantifying the effects of asymmetric information on the demand for
and supply of credit for Italian firms. In order to test for this, we assume that each firm i = 1, ..., I is willing
to invest in a project and is looking for credit to finance it. Firms in each marketm and period t decide which
bank j = 1, ..., Jmt to borrow from, based on the conditions offered that maximize the expected "profits"20
of their choice. This determines the demand for credit. Conditional on demand, firms decide the amount of
credit to use and whether to default or not. The supply of credit results from banks’ static Bertrand-Nash
competition on interest rates, an assumption we motivate later in this section.
The theoretical model we develop is based on the following assumptions:
(1) Asymmetric Information: Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we assume that the asymmetry of
information is on the riskiness of the firm, known by the firm but not by the bank, whereas the
distribution of riskiness among all firms is known by both. We identify this riskiness with the firm’s
probability of default. We let borrowers and lenders be risk neutral.
(2) First Year of New Loans: We limit our analysis to the first year of newly granted loans. This is
a common assumption in empirical models of insurance with asymmetric information, starting from
Chiappori and Salanié (2000). This is done to avoid modeling heterogenous experience ratings among
borrowers and loan renegotiation, as the focus of the paper is on first access to credit.
(3) Main New Credit Line: We just consider the choice of the main new credit line that firms open for
the first time within our sample. The main line is defined as the one from which the firm borrows the
most. As shown by Detragiache et al. (2000), in Italy, multiple relationship banking is widely used by
firms to reduce liquidity risk. However, the share of the main credit line opened accounts on average
for over 70% of the total amount of new yearly credit (both usable and used), justifying the choice of
this simplifying assumption.21
(4) Posted Interest Rates: We assume that banks have posted interest rates for types of firms k = 1, ...,K
in each market m and period t, depending on the borrowers’ characteristics. Following the work by
Albareto, Benvenuti, Mocetti, Pagnini and Rossi (2011) on the determinants of interest rates decisions,
these types are defined by the amount of credit granted, the firm’s sector, the firm’s size in terms of
sales, and the observable riskiness of the firm defined by the SCORE.22 There two main reasons
why we make this simplifying assumption. First, we need to predict prices based on observables to
compute interest rates offered by banks but not not taken by firms. We find that the observables we
use explain a large part of the variation in prices, suggesting the use by banks of a standardized pricing
model as explained in Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011).23 Moreover, the residual variation in
prices has a very low explanatory power of defaults, ensuring that the posted rates we use include
20 We will define these profits as utilities later on, to distinguish them from banks’ profits.
21 We tried to make use of a borrower’s ranking of its lenders, in terms of amount used, for identification purposes. However,
only a subset of the firms in our sample borrows from multiple banks, so we ended up not using this information.
22 The construction and detailed rationale for these posted interest rates is described in Appendix A.
23 In the pricing regression we run we get a R2 of 0.5068, higher than most of the studies cited in Cerqueiro et al. (2011), who
argue that a higher R2 based on observables reflects the prevalence of "rules" over "discretion" in interest rates setting.
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the most relevant information banks use to price risk.24 Second, we are mostly interested for our
counterfactuals in the price variation at the bank-year-province level, which is also the dimension at
which we have credible instruments for interest rates.
(5) Exogenous Amount of Credit: We limit our analysis to the interest rate as the only screening device,
as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Therefore, we assume that the amount of credit granted from bank j
to firm i is exogenously given by the firm’s project requirements, and that the bank just offers a posted
interest rate for that specific amount to each type k in each marketm. In a standard insurance or credit
market with asymmetric information, firms are likely to compete not only on prices, but on other
clauses of the contract as well. In our context, the amount granted could be another dimension over
which banks compete. In a world with lending exclusivity, banks can offer menus of amounts granted
with matched interest rates to reduce the extent of asymmetric information, for example charging rates
that increase more than proportionally with the amount granted. However, this is the case only with
contract exclusivity, which is not a feature of our setting, where borrowers can open multiple credit
lines with different lenders. As explained in Chiappori and Salanié (2013), in absence of exclusivity
no convex price schedule can be implemented, because if interest rates rise with the amount borrowed,
borrowers can “linearize” the schedule by opening several credit lines with multiple banks. Empirical
evidence of non-exclusivity results also from the pricing regression described in Appendix A, which
presents a negative correlation between interest rates and the amount of credit granted.25 Moreover,
the assumption of setting the loan amount as part of the definition of type is also justified by the
distribution of amounts granted, characterized by a high concentration of loans around specific mass
points. We also assume no collateral, as the type of loans we analyze are uncollateralized. We do
however allow for an endogenous amount of loan used.
(6) Ever Default: We define as defaulter a firm that defaults on any loan, even in the years after the first
loan we consider. We track these firms’ default until 2001, which is 3 years after the end of our loans’
sample. In the data, a firm is considered as a defaulter when the bank classifies its loan as a bad loan,
which means that the firm is past due on its loan and the bank believes the firm won’t be able to repay.
4.1 Demand, Loan Size and Default
Given these assumptions, let there be i = 1, ..., I firms of observable type k = 1, ...,K and j = 1, ..., Jmt
banks in m = 1, ...,M markets in period t = 1, ..., T . Let firms have the following utility from credit,26
which determines their demand:
UDikjmt = α¯
D
1 + α
D
2 P˜jmt +X
′
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δDjmt
+σDνi + Y
′
ijη
D + γDk︸ ︷︷ ︸
V Dijk
+εDikjmt. (3)
24 When we regress default on the same observables we use in the price regression, we find that adding the residuals from the
pricing model as a regressor increases the R2 from 0.3830 to 0.3881.
25 We thank Pierre-André Chiappori for his suggestions on this point.
26 We explain in Appendix A how we separate the jmt-level price variation, absorbed by δjmt, and the k-level price variation,
absorbed by γk.
14
We let UDik0mt = ε
D
ik0mt be the utility from the outside option, which is not borrowing. Firms will choose
the bank that maximizes their utility, or will choose not to borrow. Then, conditional on borrowing, they
will choose the share of amount granted to use that maximizes the following utility:
ULikmt = α
L
1 + α
L
2 P˜jmt +X
′
jmtβ
L + ξLjmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δLjmt
+Y ′ijη
L + γLk︸ ︷︷ ︸
V Lijk
+εLikmt. (4)
Finally, conditional on borrowing, they will choose to default if the following utility is greater than zero:
UFikmt = α
F
1 + α
F
2 P˜jmt +X
′
jmtβ
F + ξFjmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δFjmt
+Y ′ijη
F + γFk︸ ︷︷ ︸
V Fijk
+εFikmt. (5)
Here Xjmt are banks’ observable attributes, P˜jmt are the posted interest rates mentioned above, ξjmt are
banks’ unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes, Yij are firm specific and firm-bank specific observ-
able characteristics, and γk are types’ fixed effects. We assume that εDikjmt is distributed as a type 1 ex-
treme value, following the literature on demand estimation for differentiated products (Berry (1994), Berry
et al. (1995)). We let the random coefficient of the demand’s constant term αD1i = α¯
D
1 + σ
Dνi,27 with
νi ∼ N(0, 1),28 to be jointly normally distributed with εLikmt, and εFikmt, such that: α
D
1
εL
εF
 ∼ N

 α¯
D
1
0
0
 ,
 σ
D2 ρDLσ
DσL ρDFσ
DσF
ρDLσ
DσL σL2 ρLFσ
LσF
ρDFσ
DσF ρLFσ
LσF σF2

 . (6)
We interpret a positive correlation between the firm specific unobservables driving demand and default
(ρDF ) as evidence of adverse selection. The intuition is that if the unobservables that drive demand are
positively correlated with the unobservables that drive default, then riskier firms are more likely to demand
loans. The idea behind the identification of the correlation between αD1 and ε
F is the following. If we
observe a firm taking out a loan, while the model tells us that this firm should be unlikely to take the loan,
then this is a "high αD1 " firm. A positive correlation of α
D
1 with ε
F is evidence of adverse selection.
We interpret a positive correlation between the unobservables driving loan usage and default (ρLF ) as other
possible evidence of adverse selection. The intuition is that if the unobservables that drive the choice of
how much credit to use are positively correlated with the unobservables that drive default, then riskier firms
will use more credit. With this definition of adverse selection we are trying to capture the case in which a
risky firm (high εF ), before signing the contract, already knows that due to its high εL it will use a higher
share of the loan. However, our definition cannot rule out the case in which two ex-ante equally risky firms
take the same loan, and one of them is hit by a negative shock after the contract has been signed. This
27 Following Nevo (2000b), we interpret Y ′ijη
D + γk as observed heterogeneity in the constant random coefficient. Given that
the constant is normalized to zero for the outside option, also Y ′ijη
D + γk will be zero for the outside option in order for ηD and
γk to be identified. These demographics help us to control for the observable sources of the borrower’s taste for credit (regardless
of which bank it chooses), leaving νi as the unobservables taste for credit.
28 We use 100 Halton draws for simulation. According to Train and Winston (2007), 100 Halton draws achieve greater accuracy
in mixed logit estimations than 1,000 pseudo-random draws.
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shock increases εL for the firm that was hit, forcing it to use more of the loan.29 This is however not a
major concern in our case, as we just focus on the first year of the firm-bank relationship. The correlation
between unobservables driving demand and loan use (ρDL) doesn’t have a clear economic interpretation
in terms of asymmetric information, but it’s important to estimate it jointly with the other elements of
the variance-covariance matrix, to avoid capturing with ρDF and ρLF any possible spurious correlation.
The joint estimation of these parameters guarantees a better identification of adverse selection compared
to the reduced form estimates, where each correlation coefficient was estimated separately. Note that this
identification strategy allows us to recover adverse selection parameters that are common across banks and
markets, not bank or market specific.30
This set up builds on Einav et al. (2012), but differs in the specification of the demand utility. In our
case, borrowers’ choices follow a multinomial distribution, instead of a binomial. This raises the issue of
correlating residuals from the demand model, which vary across borrowers and alternatives (i.e. lenders),
to the residuals from the loan use and default models, which instead vary only across borrowers. We follow
the approach of Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and allow the normally distributed random coefficient on
the constant term to be correlated with the residuals from the loan use and default equations. We argue
that this a practical and intuitive solution, as it simplifies the problem and allows for a correlation between
unobservables only at the level of the borrower. This implies that in the presence of adverse selection a
riskier firm is more likely to demand from any lender, and not differently across different lenders.
4.2 Supply
On the supply side, we let banks set their interest rates competing à la Bertrand Nash. We assume that bank
j’s expected profits in market m at time t are given by:
Πjmt = (P˜jmt −MCjmt)Qjmt(1− Fjmt)−MCjmtQjmtFjmt
= P˜jmtQjmt(1− Fjmt)−MCjmtQjmt,
(7)
where Qjmt and Fjmt are banks’ expectation of demand and default. In particular, Qjmt is given by the
model’s market shares and the expected loan use, and Fjmt is the average (expected) default rate for the
borrowers that bank j lends to in market m. P˜jmt is the posted price of the loan, and MCjmt are the bank’s
marginal costs. It is important to note that Fjmt depends on price through two channels. First, equation
(5) allows for a direct impact of the interest rate on firms’ default probabilities. Second, a higher interest
rate also changes the composition of borrowers as stated in Assumption 1: increasing price increases the
conditional expectation of αD1 , as low-utility-from-borrowing firms are more likely to self-select out of the
borrowing pool. If ρDF > 0, this implies that an increase in prices increases the probability of default of
the pool of borrowers.
29 In this case, ρLF could be interpreted as evidence of either adverse selection or moral hazard. See Abbring et al. (2003) for
distinguishing between those sources of asymmetric information.
30Extending the model to allow for heterogeneity across banks is scope for future research.
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The first order conditions of this profit function deliver the following pricing equation:
P˜jmt =
MCjmt
1− Fjmt − F ′jmt QjmtQ′jmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Marginal Costs
+
−(1− Fjmt)QjmtQ′jmt
1− Fjmt − F ′jmt QjmtQ′jmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
, (8)
Note that the equilibrium price depends on what we define as "effective" marginal costs and on a markup
term. F ′jmt is the derivative of the expected default rate with respect to prices, and Q
′
jmt is the derivative
of the market share with respect to prices. Qjmt
Q′jmt
would be the markup in a Bertrand-Nash model with
differentiated products and no asymmetric information. In fact if there was no default, i.e. Fjmt = F ′jmt =
0, we would be back to a standard equilibrium pricing equation for differentiated firms competing à la
Bertrand-Nash as in Berry et al. (1995). We will analyze this equilibrium pricing equation in greater detail
in the next section.
4.3 Monte Carlo
We construct a simple numerical example to give the intuition underlying the model’s predictions. We
simulate data for the case of a monopolist bank facing i = 1, ..., I heterogeneous borrowers. For simplicity,
we concentrate on adverse selection between demand and default (ρDF ), setting loan use to 1 and ρDL =
ρLF = 0. We keep this data fixed and vary both borrowers’ price sensitivity, as a proxy for the strength
of the effects of a competitive fringe on the bank’s (residual) demand curve, and the extent of asymmetric
information, where ρDF < 0 means advantageous selection and ρDF > 0 means adverse selection. For each
of these cases we compute the bank’s equilibrium prices based on our model. Let borrower i have UDi utility
from taking credit from the bank, UDi0 utility from not borrowing, and U
F
i utility from defaulting:
UDi = α1i + α2P + i,
= α¯1 + σνi + α2P + i,
UDi0 = i0,
UFi = εi,
(9)
where P is the interest rate charged by the bank, i, i0 are distributed as type 1 extreme value, and νi ∼
N(0, 1). We set σ = 2 and α¯1 = 1, and allow α1i and εi to be jointly normally distributed, with correlation
coefficient −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. We assume that all the borrowers have the same price sensitivity α2 < 0. Our
asymmetric information assumption implies that a bank doesn’t observe its borrowers’ individual default
probability, but only its distribution. As a consequence, it only offers one pooling price P for everyone.
Given this setup, the demand probability will be given by:
PrDi = Pr(α1i + α2P + i > i0)
= exp(α1i+α2P )1+
∑
` exp(α1i+α2P )
= Λ(α1i + α2P ),
(10)
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and we will construct the bank’s market share as S = 1N
∑
i Pr
D
i , where N is the number of borrowers of
the bank. Conditional on demand, the default probability is (Wooldridge (2002)):
PrF |D=1i = E
[
Pr(F = 1|ν, P )|D = 1, P ]
= 1Λ(α1i+α2P )
∫ ∞
−(α1i+α2P ) Φ
(
ρν
σ2√
1− ρ2
σ2
)
φ(ν)dν,
(11)
and we will construct the bank’s share of defaulters as F = 1N
∑
i Pr
F
i . Given these probabilities and our
supply side model described in equations (7) and (8), the first order condition will deliver the following
equilibrium pricing equation:
P ∗ =
MC
1− F − F ′ 1α2(1−S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Marginal Costs
+
−(1− F ) 1α2(1−S)
1− F − F ′ 1α2(1−S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
, (12)
where the first term on the right hand side represents what we define as "effective" marginal cost (EffMC),
and the second term represents the markup (MKP). F ′ is the derivative of the expected default rate with
respect to price, and α2(1− S) is the derivative of the market share with respect to price.
The different effects of EffMC and MKP on the equilibrium price is crucial to understanding the interaction
between asymmetric information and imperfect competition. This is displayed in Figures 1 and 2, where
the top graph represents EffMC above and negative of the markup below, and the bottom graph shows
equilibrium prices for a monopolist bank. We let these three elements vary across different degrees of
adverse selection, measured by ρ, and “competition”, measured by α2. In this example we are capturing
competition versus the outside option, but we have verified that increasing the number of banks in the model
gives the same qualitative result.
Looking at Figure 1, for a high level of competition (i.e. rightmost point on the figure) an increase in
adverse selection (moving to the northwest) causes EffMC to increase, whereas for low competition (point
closest to the reader, again moving northwest) they remain relatively constant. The intuition for this result
is the following. Higher adverse selection implies higher correlation between borrowers’ willingness to
pay (WTP) and their riskiness. Hence, with strong competition only firms with high WTP will borrow,
whereas with less competition even firms with low WTP will take credit, lowering the average riskiness of
the pool of borrowers. The opposite happens for the markup curve as we increase adverse selection, because
it remains nearly constant for high competition (rightmost point, moving to the northwest), but it decreases
substantially for a low level of competition (closest point to the reader, moving to the northwest). The reason
for this sharp reduction in markup with low competition as adverse selection increases is that the marginal
borrowers become the safest ones, implying a reduction in the banks’ market power to keep them. Finally,
what the graph shows is that both an increase in adverse selection and an increase in competition reduces a
bank’s markup, implying that adverse selection has a mitigating effect on market power.
As shown in Figure 2, the combination of these two factors results in a non-monotonic equilibrium price
response to an increase in adverse selection. If on one hand the equilibrium price rises in a very competitive
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environment (closest point to the reader, moving to the northeast), the opposite happens in a concentrated
market (leftmost point, moving to the northeast). This is because in the first case the price depends more on
EffMC than markup and the increasing EffMC drives the price up. In a highly competitive market where
banks have a small price-cost margin, a higher price is the only possible response to an increase in adverse
selection. In the second case, the price depends more on markup and the declining markup drives the price
down. Banks with a higher price-cost margin will find it more profitable to reduce the price, as this will
allow them to lower the average riskiness to their pool of borrowers.
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Figure 1: Adverse Selection vs Imperfect Competition - Effective Marginal Costs, negative Markups
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Note: The vertical axis shows the value of effective marginal costs and of the negative of the markup. The left horizontal axis is level
of adverse selection, increasing towards left. The right horizontal axis is the level of price sensitivity (our measure of competition
with the outside option), increasing towards the right.
Figure 2: Adverse Selection vs Imperfect Competition - Equilibrium Prices
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Note: The vertical axis shows the level of equilibrium prices. The left horizontal axis is level of price sensitivity (our measure
of competition with the outside option), increasing towards the right. The right horizontal axis is the level of adverse selection,
increasing towards right. The axis definitions in this figure differ from those in Figure 1 to better display the effects in each.
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5 Econometric Specification
Following the model presented above, let m = 1, ...,M index a province, t = 1, ..., T a year, i = 1, ..., I
the firm, and j = 1, ..., Jmt be the bank/loan identifier in market m at time t. Moreover, let k = 1, ...,K
identify the type of firm that is borrowing. The k index further segments the market, as banks can lend
across all types of firms within the same market, but firms can only borrow at the interest rate offered to
their own type. Let Yij be a vector of firm and firm-bank specific characteristics (firm’s balance sheet data,
firm’s age, and firm’s distance to the closest branch of each bank), Xjmt a vector of bank-province-year
specific attributes (number of branches in the market, years of presence in the market, bank and year fixed
effects), and γk types’ fixed effects.
We estimate a system of three equations: demand for credit, amount of loan used, and default. We use
a 2-step method based on maximum simulated likelihood and instrumental variables, as in Train (2009).
In the first step we estimate the firm-level parameters η = {ηD, ηL, ηF }, the types’ fixed effects γk =
{γDk , γLk , γFk }, and the elements of the variance-covariance matrix Σ = {σD, σL, ρDF , ρDL, ρLF } from the
firms’ choice probabilities. This specification builds on Einav et al. (2012), but differs from them as we
estimate demand using a mixed logit with random coefficients, rather than a probit. We also recover the
lender-province-year specific constants δ̂jmt = {δ̂Djmt, δ̂Ljmt, δ̂Fjmt} using the contraction method introduced
by Berry (1994).
The probability that borrower i of type k in market m at time t chooses lender j is given by:
PrDikjmt =
∫ [ exp(δ̂Djmt(Xjmt, P˜jmt, ξDjmt, βD) + V Dijk(Yij , ηD, γDk ))
1 +
∑
` exp(δ̂
D
`mt(X`mt, P˜`mt, ξ
D
`mt, β
D) + V Dijk(Yij , η
D, γDk ))
]
f(αD1i|θ)dαD1i, (13)
where f(αD1i|θ) is the density of αD1i, and θ are the parameters of its distribution that we want to estimate.
The estimation of this choice model only provides the estimates of ηD, γDk , σ
D, but not of the parameters
in δD. Looking at the second equation, the share of credit used over granted conditional on borrowing, the
probability of observing a utilization of Likmt is given by:
PrL
ikmt,L=L∗|D=1,αD1i
= Pr(Likmt = δLjmt + V
L
ijk + ε
L
ikmt|αD1i)
=
∫
1
σ˜
εL
ikmt
|αD
1i
φεLikmt|αD1i
(
Likmt−δ̂Ljmt(Xjmt,P˜jmt,ξLjmt,βL)−V Lijk(Yij ,ηL,γLk )−µ˜εL
ikmt
|αD
1i
σ˜
εL
ikmt
|αD
1i
)
f(αD1i|θ)dαD1i,
(14)
where εLikmt|αD1i ∼ N
(
σLρDLνi︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
εL
ikmt
|αD
1i
, σ2L(1− ρ2DL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ˜2
εL
ikmt
|αD
1i
)
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where φ is a standard normal pdf. Finally, the probability of default conditional on taking a loan is:
PrFikmt,F=1|D=1,αD1i,εLikmt =
∫
ΦεFikmt|αD1i,εLikmt
(
δ̂Fjmt(Xjmt, P˜jmt, ξ
F
jmt, β
F ) + V Fijk(Yij , η
F , γFk )− µ˜εFikmt|αD1i,εLikmt
σ˜εFikmt|αD1i,εLikmt
)
f(αD1i|θ)dαD1i,
(15)
where εFikmt|αD1i, εLikmt ∼ N
(
AσDνi +Bε
L
ikmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
εF
ikmt
|αD
1i
,εL
ikmt
, σ2F − (AρDF +BρLF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ˜2
εF
ikmt
|αD
1i
,εL
ikmt
)
A = ρDF σ
2L−ρLF ρDL
σ2Dσ2L−ρ2DL
B = −ρDF ρDL+ρLF σ
2D
σ2Dσ2L−ρ2DL
where the residuals εFikmt are conditional on demand and loan amount unobservables. Similarly to the
demand side, the estimation of these two choice equations, jointly with the demand one, only delivers the
parameters ηL, ηF , γLk , γ
F
k , ρDF , ρDL, ρLF , σ
L.
In the second step, the estimated constants δ̂jmt are the dependent variables of instrumental variable re-
gressions that recover the parameters α = {α¯D1 , αD2 , αL1 , αL2 , αF1 , αF2 } and β = {βD, βL, βF } of the
bank specific attributes Xjmt and prices P˜jmt. This second step also controls for the potential endogene-
ity bias caused by the correlation between prices and unobserved (to the econometrician) bank attributes
ξjmt = {ξDjmt, ξLjmt, ξFjmt}. Following Berry (1994), the contraction method on the demand side finds the
δD that equate predicted market shares ŜDjmt to actual market shares S
D
jmt. This iterative process is defined
by:
δD,r+1jmt = δ
D,r
jmt + ln
(
SDjmt
ŜDjmt(δ
D,r
jmt)
)
. (16)
The predicted market shares are defined as ŜDjmt =
∑
i Pr
D
ikjmt/Nmt, where Nmt are the number of firms in
market m at time t. Given the value of these constant terms, the parameters α¯D1 , α
D
2 , β
D are estimated using
instrumental variables:
δDjmt = α¯
D
1 + α
D
2 P˜jmt +X
′
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt, (17)
with ξDjmt being the mean zero structural econometric error term. Similarly, the lender-market constants for
loan use δLjmt and default δ
F
jmt are estimated using a nonlinear least squares search routine as in Goolsbee
and Petrin (2004), which solves for:
δLjmt = arg min
δL
∑
j
(
ŜLjmt(η
L, δL)− SLjmt
)2
, (18)
δFjmt = arg min
δF
∑
j
(
ŜFjmt(η
F , δF )− SFjmt
)2
, (19)
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where ŜLjmt, Ŝ
F
jmt and S
L
jmt, S
F
jmt are the predicted and actual shares of loan uses and defaults for lender j
in market m at time t. Given the value of these constant terms, the parameters αL1 , α
L
2 , β
L and αF1 , α
F
2 , β
F
are estimated using instrumental variables:
δLjmt = α
L
1 + α
L
2 P˜jmt +X
′
jmtβ
L + ξLjmt, (20)
δFjmt = α
F
1 + α
F
2 P˜jmt +X
′
jmtβ
F + ξFjmt. (21)
6 Estimation
We use the demand, loan use and default probabilities to construct the simulated maximum likelihood that
allows us to recover the parameters in η, γk,Σ:
logL =
∑
i
log(PrDikjmt)dikjmt+
∑
i∈D
[
log(PrLikmt)+log(Pr
F
ikmt)fikmt+log(1−PrFikmt)(1−fikmt)
]
, (22)
where dikjmt is the dummy for the choice by firm i of type k of bank j in market m at time t, and fikmt is
the dummy identifying its default. In order to estimate the remaining parameters we need an additional step
explained below.
6.1 Constructing the Sample
As already mentioned, we focus on the first line of credit that a firm opens (at least within our dataset),
excluding the first year (1988) to avoid left censoring. We do this to concentrate on new borrowers, where
we expect to find stronger asymmetric information, and because modeling the evolution of the borrower-
lender relationship is beyond the scope of this paper.31 Following other papers on Italian local credit markets,
like Felici and Pagnini (2008), Bofondi and Gobbi (2006), and Gobbi and Lotti (2004), we identify banking
markets as the Italian provinces, also used by Italian supervisory authorities as proxies for the local markets
for deposits.32 Our markets are then constructed as province-year combinations. We assume that each
firm’s choice set is defined by all the banks that are actively lending in its province.33 We define the loan
use variable as the share of loan used over loan granted, and define default as an ever default variable, as
explained before.
31 A more extensive description of the construction of the sample is in Appendix A.
32 See Ciari and Pavanini (2014) and Guiso et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion on the definition of local banking markets in
Italy.
33 As many other papers estimating demand for differentiated products, we face the problem of zero market shares causing the
second stage IV estimation to deliver inconsistent estimates, as described in Ghandi, Lu and Shi (2013). We deal with this excluding
from the borrowers’ choice set banks with non-zero branches but with zero market shares in a local market. As this might be a
source of bias, adopting the method of Ghandi et al. (2013) to tackle this problem is scope for future research.
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The observable explanatory variables that determine firm’s demand, loan use and default choices are firm
and bank characteristics, previously summarized in Table 1. In the first set of regressors we include firms’
fixed assets, the ratio of intangible over total assets, net worth, trade debit, profits, cash flow, and age, where
trade debit is the debit that the firm has with its suppliers or clients. We also include types’ fixed effects,
where a type is defined as a combination of amount granted, sector, size, and score.34 In the second group
we use our predicted posted prices, bank’s share of branches in the province, number of years the bank had at
least one branch in the province, as well as bank and year dummies. We also control for the distance between
each firm and the closest branch of each bank. We provide details on these variables in the appendix. We
motivate the choice of these explanatory variables in Section 6.3.
6.2 Identification
The use of instrumental variables in the second step of the estimation aims at correcting the potential endo-
geneity bias in the price coefficient for the three equations. The bias derives from the possible correlation
between prices P˜jmt and unobserved (to the econometrician) bank-market level characteristics ξjmt. These
unobserved attributes can be thought as the borrowers’ valuation of a banks’ brand, quality, and credibility,
which are assumed to influence borrowers’ demand, loan use, and default decisions, but are also very likely
to be correlated with banks’ interest rates. Think for example of ξjmt as a banks’ reputation for offering
valuable and helpful assistance to its borrowers in their business projects, which is unobserved to the econo-
metrician but known to the firms. Borrowers will value this quality when deciding which bank to get credit
from, and they will also be affected in their likelihood of using more or less credit and of defaulting. Con-
sequently, the bank will be likely to charge a higher interest rate, given the potentially higher markup that
this attribute can provide. Moreover, assuming default is increasing in interest rates, a good assistance can
lower the borrower’s default probability, allowing banks to charge a higher rate.
To address the simultaneity problem, following Nevo (2001), we include bank dummies to capture the bank
characteristics that do not vary by market (year-province). This means that the correlation between prices
and banks’ nationwide-level unobserved characteristics is fully accounted for with these fixed effects, and
does not require any instruments. We also include year fixed effects to control for any macroeconomic
changes over time, as well as province fixed effects to control for time-invariant province characteristics that
equally affect banks. We can rewrite equation (17), and similarly equations (20) and (21), as:
δDjmt = α¯
D
1 + α
D
2 P˜jmt +X
′
jmtβ
D + ξDj + τ
D
t + ω
D
m + ∆ξ
D
jmt, (23)
where ξDj , τ
D
t , ω
D
m are bank, year, and province fixed effects, and ∆ξ
D
jmt are bank-province-time specific
deviations from the national mean valuation of the bank.35 Therefore, we need to use instrumental variables
to account for the potential correlation between interest rates and these bank-province-time specific devi-
ations. We argue that a valid instrument is represented by prices in other markets, following Nevo (2001)
and Hausman and Taylor (1981). This implies instrumenting the prices charged by a bank j in a market m
34 See the Appendix A for a detailed description of the types.
35 Note that we exclude year fixed effects from the loan use second stage OLS and IV as they’re all statistically insignificant and
actually worsen the goodness of fit of the model.
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in year t with the average of the prices that the same bank charges in all the other provinces and years. We
actually construct an average weighted by the distance from province m, giving more weight to provinces
further away from m. The first stage regression shows that these are relevant instruments, with high R2
and F -statistic of 18.31.36 Comparing the OLS and IV results, we show how the instruments lessen the
simultaneity bias in the demand second stage.37 We find no statistical significant effect of interest rates on
loan use and default. For the first, this might mean that other variables are the main drivers of loan use,
such as firm’s balance sheet and macroeconomic conditions. For the latter, our definition of default implies
that the price we use might not be the one the firm faces when it actually defaults. Last, for the exclusion
restriction to hold, we assume that bank-province-time specific deviations ∆ξDjmt are uncorrelated with the
average price charged by the same bank in all other markets and years. We interpret these deviations, for
example, as market specific differences in a bank’s quality with respect to its national average quality. These
can be thought as differences in local managers’ capacities, or in a bank’s management connections with
the local industries and authorities. These factors are likely to influence a bank’s prices in that local market
and year, but not its pricing decision in other markets, where the local managers price according to their
market-specific valuations.
6.3 Results
The estimates of the structural model are presented in Table 3. The three columns of results refer respectively
to the demand, loan use and default equations. The top part of the table shows the effect of firm character-
istics, the middle one the effect of bank characteristics, and the bottom one shows the covariance matrix,
where we interpret as adverse selection the correlation between unobservables of demand and default (ρDF )
and the correlation between unobservables of loan use and default (ρLF ). We decided to include specific
firm characteristics to control for different measures of firms’ assets, profitability, debt, age, and distance,
and for our definition of observable type. We chose among the wide set of balance sheet variables running
various reduced form regressions for demand, loan use, and default. We wanted to control for different
measures of firm size, in the form of assets,38 but also for some measures of firms’ current performance, in
terms of profits and cash flow. We also tried to control for other specific forms of finance that firms have
access to, such as credit from suppliers.39 Finally, we computed the firm’s age and the distance between
the city council where the firm is located and the city council where the closest branch of each bank in
the firm’s choice set is located.40 As introduced in the previous sections, we include fixed effects for the
type of the firm as a determinant of the posted prices.41 Following the survey of Albareto et al. (2011),
these types are constructed as the combination of the firm’s sector (primary, secondary, tertiary), size (sales
36 First stage estimates are reported in Appendix B.
37 OLS and IV second stage estimates are reported in Appendix B.
38 Albareto et al. (2011) describe the importance of firms’ size in the organization of lending in the Italian banking sector.
39 Petersen and Rajan (1995) use the amount of trade credit as a key variable to determine if borrowers are credit constrained, as
it’s typically a more expensive form of credit than banks’ credit lines.
40 It is important to include distance as Degryse and Ongena (2005) show evidence of spatial price discrimination in lending
relationship using Belgian data. They find that loan rates decrease with the distance between the borrower and the lender, and
increase with the distance between the borrower and the competing lenders.
41 See Appendix A for a detailed description of how we construct types.
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above or below the median), riskiness (three risk categories based on the SCORE), and amount granted (five
categories between 0 and 3,000,000 e).42 We also included the number and the share of branches that a
bank has in a market (province-year), as well as the number of years that it has been in the market. We have
data on branches from 1959, so we can observe banks’ presence in each council for the 30 years before the
beginning of our loan sample. These variables aim at capturing the level of experience that a bank has in a
market, as well as the density of its network of branches with respect to its competitors, which can both be
relevant features influencing firms’ decisions.
The estimates present evidence of adverse selection both in the correlation between demand and default
unobservables, and in the correlation between loan use and default unobservables. This confirms the re-
sults of the the reduced form test that we presented earlier, but with a smaller effect on the demand-default
dimension. One possible interpretation is that the structural model allows for a more flexible correlation
structure, as it also estimates a positive and significant correlation between demand and loan use unobserv-
ables.43 Looking at the demand side, we find that distance and prices have a negative impact on demand, as
expected. Firms with more net worth, cash flow and trade debit are less likely to demand credit, but firms
with more fixed assets and profits are more likely to borrow. Older firms are also less likely to demand.
Firms tend to favor banks with a higher share of branches, but are less likely to demand form banks with
longer experience in a market. This might be because the sample we are considering is of new borrowers,
which might be perceived as more risky by experienced banks. Hence, these firms are more likely to get
better conditions from less experienced banks. The share of loan used seems to follow the same logic as de-
mand for fixed assets, net worth, profits and cash flow. Differently from demand, the share of loan used over
granted is increasing in trade debit. For what concerns the default probability, this is negatively influenced
by higher cash flow, but positively affected by the ratio of intangible assets. As explained earlier, interest
rates don’t seem to affect how much credit to use and subsequent default.
The mean of own and cross price elasticities for the main 5 banks in the sample are reported in Table 4. We
find that on average a 1% increase in interest rate reduces a bank’s own market share by around 3.5%, and
increases competitor banks’ shares by about 0.1%.
42 In Appendix A we describe how we predict amount granted for non-borrowing firms, which we don’t observe in the data.
The categories that the model predicts best are 101,000-200,000 and 201,000-500,000e, which are also the most demanded ones,
therefore we just focus on those two.
43 Another possible reason is that in the structural model we are controlling for price endogeneity, and in the reduced form tests
we are not, which might imply a potential bias in the latter.
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Table 3: Structural Estimates
Variables Demand Loan Use Default
Assets

Fixed Assets 0.172∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -0.019
(0.009) (0.004) (0.034)
Intangible/Total Assets -0.514∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.043) (0.086)
Net Worth -0.303∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.013) (0.007) (0.086)
Profitability

Profits 0.553∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.030) (0.018) (0.074)
1st Stage Cash Flow -0.385∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗
Firm Level (0.030) (0.018) (0.105)
Debt
{
Trade Debit -0.924∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ -0.117
(0.050) (0.027) (0.101)
Others

Firm’s Age -0.514∗∗∗ 0.062∗ -0.085
(0.068) (0.033) (0.074)
Distance -0.721∗∗∗ -0.007 0.106
(0.048) (0.036) (0.073)
Type FE Yes Yes Yes
Interest Rate -4.316∗ -0.146 5.599
(2.591) (0.159) (11.587)
Number of Branches 1.102∗∗∗ -0.034 0.167
2nd Stage (0.143) (0.100) (0.668)
Bank Level Share of Branches 0.314 0.120 0.578
(0.416) (0.239) (2.010)
Years in Market 0.395∗∗∗ -0.084∗ 0.297
(0.096) (0.047) (0.478)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 283,995 4,931 4,931
Covariance matrix
σD = 0.106∗∗∗
(0.000)
ρDL = 0.095∗∗∗ σL = 0.905∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Adverse Selection
ρDF = 0.020∗∗∗ ρLF = 0.169∗∗∗ σF = 1
(0.000) (0.000)
Note: The top panel shows the estimates of the first stage η, γk. The middle panel shows the estimates of the second stage
α, β, τt, ξj . The bottom panel shows the estimates of the variance-covariance Σ. The first column of results refers to the demand
model, the second to the loan use, and the third to the default. Standard errors are in brackets. ∗ is significant at the 10% level,
∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ ∗ ∗ at the 1% level. First stage standard errors are calculated by the inverse of the Information matrix,
obtained providing the solver with analytical gradient and hessian. Second stage standard errors are computed with 200 iteration of
parametric bootstrap.
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Table 4: Mean across Markets of Own and Cross Price Elasticities for Main Banks
Banks Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5
Bank 1 -3.663 0.104 0.107 0.122 0.089
Bank 2 0.172 -3.602 0.099 0.164 0.136
Bank 3 0.125 0.093 -3.440 0.120 0.102
Bank 4 0.124 0.102 0.099 -3.544 0.094
Bank 5 0.158 0.147 0.175 0.154 -3.464
Note: These are the first 5 banks in terms of national market shares. Elasticities are interpreted as the percentage change in market
shares in response to a 1% increase in prices.
6.4 Fit of the Model
We provide some descriptives on the fit of the model. We choose to focus on the main objects of interest of
the counterfactual exercise, that is banks’ market shares, loan use shares and default shares, and equilibrium
prices. We compare actual and predicted shares, as well as actual prices to those that maximize our profit
function in equation 7. Summary statistics are presented in Table 5, and Figure 3 gives a graphical illustra-
tion. Based on the model fit, we decide to exclude some markets from the sample for the counterfactuals.
First, in 5 out of the 396 markets there is at least one bank for which our model predicts negative marginal
costs, so we drop those 1.2% of observations. Second, even though our model predicts reasonably well
equilibrium prices,44 there are some outliers for which the model gives a poor prediction. We decide to
winsorize the data at the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution of percentage difference between pre-
dicted and actual prices, and exclude the markets where at least one bank is in the winsorized interval, which
represent about 9% of the sample’s observations. Note that this slight reduction in sample size has almost
no effect on the counterfactuals’ results.
The model shows a good fit, with a few exceptions: the predicted market shares’ distribution is slightly more
skewed to the left, and the predicted default shares’ distribution seems slightly more skewed to the right.
The supply model tends to predict higher prices than the actual ones, and we find that effective marginal
costs represent on average 70% of the price, and markups about 12%.
44 The median deviation of model predicted prices from actual prices is 6%. While not perfect, we note that we do not impose the
pricing moment conditions in estimation (as is often done in the empirical literature), which would necessarily improve the model
fit at the expense of having an impact on the estimated adverse selection parameters which are our primary point of interest.
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Table 5: Descriptives on Model Fit
Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev. 10th Pctile 50th Pctile 90th Pctile
Actual Market Shares 1,785 0.057 0.070 0.005 0.031 0.143
Predicted Market Shares 1,785 0.037 0.046 0.003 0.021 0.088
Actual Loan Use Shares 1,785 0.146 0.242 0.003 0.079 0.343
Predicted Loan Use Shares 1,785 0.139 0.146 0.018 0.093 0.311
Actual Default Shares 1,785 0.029 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.083
Predicted Default Shares 1,785 0.024 0.044 0.000 0.009 0.062
Actual Prices 1,785 16.59 2.56 13.54 16.48 20.16
Predicted Prices 1,785 18.16 2.90 14.55 17.99 21.88
Predicted Effective MC 1,785 70.1% 14.6% 53.3% 69.6% 89.4%
Predicted Markups 1,785 11.8% 6.4% 5.4% 10.5% 19.1%
Note: Prices are average prices at the year-province-bank level. Predicted Effective MC and Markups are expressed as percentages
of predicted prices.
Figure 3: Kernel Density of Actual Data vs Model Predictions
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7 Counterfactuals
We run a counterfactual policy experiment to quantify the effects of asymmetric information, as well as to
understand the relationship between asymmetric information and imperfect competition. We simulate an
increase in adverse selection, identified by the correlation between unobservables driving both demand and
default (ρDF ) and loan size and default (ρLF ). We analyze the consequence of this change on equilibrium
prices, quantities, and defaults. The rationale for this policy experiment is twofold. First, we want to give an
economic interpretation to the effect of the estimated correlation coefficients in terms of relevant outcome
variables. This means looking at how prices, demand, and defaults vary as we increase the correlation coef-
ficients, just like we did in the Monte Carlo exercise. Second, an increase in adverse selection is a distinctive
feature of a financial crisis (Mishkin (2012)). During a period of crisis firms’ investment opportunities con-
tract, affecting differently the borrowing behavior of sound and risky firms. While the former will borrow
less, as they don’t invest but still expect to have a positive cash flow to use as operating liquidity, the latter
will keep borrowing as they expect their cash flow to be an insufficient source of working capital. This
can be thought as an increase in adverse selection, as it implies a higher correlation between borrowers’
willingness to pay and their probability of default.
We simulate a scenario in which we increase the estimated correlation coefficients ρDF and ρLF to 0.5.45
Once we recover the new equilibrium outcomes of interest in the new scenario, we investigate whether the
variations that we observe from the baseline model are correlated with a measure of competition in the
different local markets. In the counterfactual exercise we follow Nevo (2000a) and recover each bank’s
marginal costs using the pricing equation (8):
M̂Cjmt = P˜jmt
[
1− Fjmt − F ′jmt
Qjmt
Q′jmt
]
+
(1− Fjmt)QjmtQ′jmt
1− Fjmt − F ′jmt QjmtQ′jmt
(24)
Under the assumption that marginal costs are the same in the counterfactual scenario,46 we re-calculate
banks’ market shares, loan use and defaults with the counterfactual level of adverse selection, and derive the
new equilibrium prices as:
P jmt =
M̂Cjmt
1− F jmt − F ′jmt QjmtQ′jmt
+
−(1− F jmt)Qjmt
Q
′
jmt
1− F jmt − F ′jmt QjmtQ′jmt
, (25)
where Qjmt and F jmt are the new equilibrium quantities and defaults in the counterfactual setting. We
define quantities as market share multiplied by share of loans used, and defaults as the share of a bank’s
borrowers that default in a year-province. Following the non-monotonic price response predicted in the
45 We have experimented with greater or smaller changes in the correlation coefficients, obtaining similar results scaled up
or down depending on the size of the variation. We increase both correlation coefficients as they are both measures of adverse
selection, and from a policy perspective we are more interested in the combined effect rather than in the relative importance of each
in driving the outcomes that we are finding.
46 This might be a strong assumption, as during a period of crisis borrowing costs for banks might be rising as well. We plan to
investigate this as another possible policy experiment.
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Monte Carlo experiment, we investigate how equilibrium prices, quantities and default shares vary with
respect to the the baseline case.47 We measure these changes at the bank-year-province level. We measure
price variation as: ∆Pjmt =
P jmt−P˜jmt
P˜jmt
, demand variation as ∆Qjmt =
Q˜jmt−Qjmt
Qjmt
, and default variation
as ∆Fjmt = F˜jmt − Fjmt. Table 6 presents some descriptive statistics on the distribution of variations in
prices, quantities and defaults between the counterfactual scenario and the baseline case. Kernel densities
of these distributions are plotted in Figures 4, 5, and 6.
The rise in adverse selection causes prices to increase on average by 8.4%, but with substantial variation,
as some increase by almost 30% or above (95th percentile), and some actually decrease by around 3% or
more (5th percentile). As expected, quantities react in the opposite direction. On average banks experience
a 7.7% decrease in their quantities in a year-province, but again with a large variation. If on one hand some
banks lose more than half of their amount lent in a market (-62% at the 5th percentile), some others increase
their shares by 27% or above (95th percentile). Finally, higher adverse selection tends to worsen banks’
pool of borrowers, as there is an average 6.8 percentage points increase in the share of a bank’s defaulters in
a year-province, but in some cases default rates actually decrease.
Based on these preliminary patters, we want to investigate how these variations relate to the level of market
power that each bank has. We use the estimated markup term in the baseline case to identify banks’ market
power, that is the last term on the right hand side of equation 8, taken at the bank-year-province level.48
We run quantile regressions of price, quantity, and default variations at the bank-year-province level on
markup and other controls,49 as well as year-province fixed effects. Table 7 shows that the markup term
negatively affects the price variation, positively affects the change in quantities, and negatively impacts
the share of a bank’s defaulters. This confirms the intuition of the Monte Carlo exercise presented earlier,
because banks with higher market power respond to an increase in adverse selection lowering their prices
and expanding their credit supply. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the reduction in prices attracts
the marginal borrowers, which under adverse selection are safer than the infra-marginal ones, lowering
the bank’s share of defaulters. Looking at the estimated coefficients for the markup term, we find that
one standard deviation increase in markup reduces prices by 3.7%, increases market shares by 13.8%, and
reduces the share of defaulters by 2.4 percentage points.
These results highlight several important policy implications. First, an increase in adverse selection causes
most of the prices in our sample to increase, most of the quantities to fall and most of the defaults to rise. This
implies that, consistent with the theoretical literature on the adverse effects of asymmetric information, such
asymmetries can severely worsen lending conditions in this market, and suggests that additional policies
to mitigate this market failure would be beneficial. In other words, while market power can soften the
adverse effects of asymmetric information, these effects are not sufficient on average. That being said, our
second implication is that some markets are different: there is substantial heterogeneity in price, quantity
and default responses to this rise in adverse selection across banks and markets. It is of crucial importance
47 We predict prices based on our supply model also for the baseline case. This means that we compare predicted prices under
the estimated correlation coefficients and predicted prices under the counterfactual correlation coefficients.
48 The weighted average at the year-province level of the markup is highly correlated with the loan-based Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index of concentration, with correlation coefficient of 0.81.
49 We decide to run quantile regressions due to some outliers in the distributions of these variations. Running an OLS regression
gives almost the same results.
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for policymakers to understand how some banks and/or markets can absorb these shocks and some others
cannot. We offer one possible explanation for this heterogeneity, which is market power. We show that banks
with higher markups have a counter-cyclical effect on credit supply, responding to an increase in adverse
selection with a reduction in prices and an increase in quantity lent. Hence, if on one hand competition in
lending markets is beneficial for borrowers as it can reduce interest rates, on the other hand it forces banks to
follow the business cycle and increase rates as adverse selection rises, making borrowing firms more likely
to be credit rationed during this kind of shocks.
Table 6: Descriptives Counterfactual % Price, Market Shares, Defaults Changes
Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev. 5th Pctile 50th Pctile 95th Pctile
% Price Variation 1,785 0.084 0.209 -0.028 0.041 0.296
% Quantity Variation 1,785 -0.077 0.430 -0.627 -0.061 0.275
% Default Variation 1,785 0.068 0.109 -0.052 0.042 0.254
Note: These variations are at the bank-year-province level.
Figure 4: Kernel Density of Counterfactual % Price Change
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Note: An observation is a year-province-bank. The vertical axis is the density. The horizontal axis is the % price variation between
the baseline case and the counterfactual scenario. The graph is trimmed to avoid outliers.
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Figure 5: Kernel Density of Counterfactual % Quantity Change
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Note: An observation is a year-province-bank. The vertical axis is the density. The horizontal axis is the % quantity variation
between the baseline case and the counterfactual scenario. The graph is trimmed to avoid outliers.
Figure 6: Kernel Density of Counterfactual %-Points Default Change
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Note: An observation is a year-province-bank. The vertical axis is the density. The horizontal axis is the % default variation
between the baseline case and the counterfactual scenario. The graph is trimmed to avoid outliers.
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Table 7: Counterfactual Prices’, Quantities’ and Defaults’ quantile regressions
Variables % Price Change % Quantity Change % Default Change
Markup -0.594∗∗∗ 2.171∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.186) (0.055)
Number of Branches 0.048∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.045) (0.013)
Share of Branches 0.217∗∗∗ -0.662∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.118) (0.035)
Years in Market 0.011∗ -0.047∗∗ 0.009
(0.006) (0.020) (0.006)
Year-Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.527 0.310 0.492
N obs. 1,785 1,785 1,785
Note: An observation is a year-province-bank.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the interaction between imperfect competition and asymmetric information in the
Italian market for small business lines of credit. We have access to a rich dataset with detailed information
about credit line contracts between firms and banks, including all the main Italian credit institutions and
a highly representative sample of firms. Using these data, we provide reduced form evidence of adverse
selection in the spirit of the positive correlation test on unobservables by Chiappori and Salanié (2000). We
find stronger presence of asymmetric information for new borrowers.
Based on this evidence, we propose a structural model of firms’ demand for credit, loan use, and default, as
well as of banks’ pricing. We let differentiated banks compete à la Bertrand-Nash on interest rates in local
credit markets, but also use interest rates as a screening device, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The model
allows for imperfect competition in the lending market, accounting for asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders. We assume in fact that firms know the riskiness of their own project, but banks
can only observe the distribution of riskiness of their borrowers, conditional on observable firm characteris-
tics. When we introduce asymmetric information, our model of oligopolistic competition predicts different
banks’ interest rate reactions to an increase in adverse selection, depending on the level of competition.
We provide Monte Carlo evidence of a non-monotonic optimal bank’s price response to an increase in ad-
verse selection, depending on different measures of competition. More adverse selection causes prices to
increase in competitive markets, but can have the opposite effect in more concentrated ones, where banks
can leverage over their markup to lower prices and attract safer borrowers.
We find evidence of adverse selection in the data, in the form of a positive correlation between unobservables
determining demand and default and loan use and default. We provide evidence both with reduced form tests
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and estimating a structural model. We conduct a policy experiment to simulate the effects of a credit crunch,
in which risky firms experience a more severe financial distress and demand more credit, increasing the
extent of adverse selection. As predicted, in this counterfactual scenario equilibrium prices rise for more
competitive markets and decline for more concentrated ones. As a consequence, the share of borrowing
firms increases in more concentrated markets, and default rates fall.
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A For Online Publication - Appendix A - Constructing the Dataset
We have assembled various datasets from different sources, which are the following:
• Firm Data: Dataset from Centrale dei Bilanci with yearly (1988-1998) balance sheet data for each
firm, including both firms that take credit and don’t (outside option). This also includes the year of
birth of each firm and its location at the city council level.
• Score Data: Dataset for each firm with yearly (1982-1998) score data, with also the 6 years preceding
1988. We retain from this data the 1982-1987 average, standard deviation, and weighted average
(more weight to more recent years) of the score.
• Loan Data: Dataset from Centrale dei Rischi with yearly (1988-1998) firm-bank loan contracts,
including amount granted, amount used, interest rate, firm’s default. This is only for the main 94
banks and for short term credit lines.
• Bank Data: Dataset with yearly (1988-2002) balance sheet data for each bank, including yearly total
loans that each bank gives in each province, and its share of the total loans granted in each province.
• Branch Data: Dataset with yearly (1959-2005) branches for each bank at the city council level. This
includes the population of banks (∼ 1,500 banks).
• Coordinates Data: Based on the ISTAT city council classification, we assign to each city council the
geographic coordinates that will allow us to calculate firm-branch distances.
We first merge the firm and score datasets with the loan data, in order to have all the borrowing and not
borrowing firms together. We then take all the banks actively lending in each province and assume that
those represent the choice set for each firm, regardless of whether they have a branch in that province or not
50. We assume that each firm chooses one main credit line among all the banks available in its province. The
main line is defined as the line for which the amount used, regardless of the amount granted, is the highest.
For cases in which multiple lines have the same amount used, then the one with the lowest price is chosen.
We calculate the distance in km between the city council of each firm and the city council where each bank
from the choice set has a branch using the geographic coordinates. For each firm-bank pair, we only keep
the branch that is closest to the firm.
A.1 Predicting Prices and Amounts Granted
We only consider the first year in which a firm appears in our sample. We assume that banks have a posted
price for each observable type of firm in each market, defined as a year-province combination. We recover
this synthetic price using regression analysis based on the actual prices that we observe.51 We need to do
this to predict the price that would have been offered to firms not borrowing in the data, as well as the price
50 There is evidence in other papers (Bofondi and Gobbi (2006)), as well as in our data, that a few banks lend in some provinces
even if they don’t have a branch there.
51 For alternative ways of predicting prices see Gerakos and Syverson (2014).
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that would have been offered to borrowing firms by banks other than the chosen one. For this reason, we
use not only the interest rate charged for the main credit line, but also the rates for the other lines that a firm
opens in its first year. We run the following OLS regression:
Pikjmt = α̂+ λ̂jmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
P˜jmt
+ ω̂k︸︷︷︸
∆˜Pk
+εikjmt, (26)
where Pikjmt is the interest rate that bank j charges to firm i of type k in market m at time t, λjmt is a bank-
market-time interactive fixed effect and ωk are interactive type dummies. We define an observable type based
on the amount granted, the sector, the size in terms of sales, and the observable riskiness (SCORE). The
underlying assumption here is that the effect on prices of the observable type’s characteristics is additively
separable with respect to the bank-market effect. Table 8 summarizes all the categories that define a type,
as well as some interest rate descriptives for each value of these categories. This regression allows us to
recover the bank-market-time specific average price P˜jmt, as well as the type specific deviation from this
average ∆˜P k. Given the large number of variables estimated, we don’t report the results of the regression.52
However, given that in the estimation we will use only the bank-market-time specific average prices, we
present some descriptive statistics comparing the predicted prices P˜jmt with the actual prices Pjmt in the
data in Table 9, as well as two overlapping kernel densities in Figure 7, to show the goodness of fit of the
model.
We are mainly interested in prices at the bank-market level because we use this variable only in the second
stage of our estimation. We provide the intuition of our approach with a simplified version of the demand
model. Let the utility of firm i of type k in market m at time t to choose bank j be:
Uikjmt = δjmt + γk + εikjmt, (27)
in the first stage of our estimation we recover δ̂jmt and γ̂k, that are bank-market fixed effects and types’
fixed effects, which in the second stage are used to derive the price coefficients. We are just interested in the
price coefficient at the bank-market-time level, and the price variation at the type level will be captured by
γk, so we will only run the following second stage:
δ̂jmt = α0 + α1P˜jmt + βXjmt + ξjmt. (28)
Similarly to the price, we also need to predict what the amount granted would be for firms that don’t bor-
row. We do so using regression analysis from the borrowing firms. This is simplified by the fact that the
distribution of amounts granted among the borrowing firms shows evident mass points corresponding to
round numbers (mostly between 50 and 500 thousands euros), which are strongly correlated with several
firm characteristics (for example, bigger firms get a greater amount). Given that we just need one amount
granted for each non-borrowing firm, we calculate the median amount granted to each firm in our data, and
group the resulting amounts in the 5 categories listed in Table 8. We regress them against several firm level
52 We find that the bank-market-time fixed effects as well as the types’ fixed effects are jointly significant, and the R2 is 0.5092.
40
controls53 and a province-year-sector interactive fixed effect. The model predictions compared to the actual
amounts are shown in Table 10. The model performs relatively well for the most demanded amounts (be-
tween 50 and 500 thousand euros), but performs poorly for the least demanded ones (below 50 and above
500 thousands).
Figure 7: Kernel Densities Comparing Actual and Predicted Prices
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53 Tangible and intangible assets, total assets, net assets, short term debt, sales, profits, cashflow, SCORE, long term and short
term total bank debt, returns on assets, age of the firm.
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Table 8: Types’ Summary Statistics
Category Interest Rate
Obs Percent Mean Median Std. Dev.
Amount Granted 0 - 50,000 12,135 12.16 16.75 16.34 4.70
50,001 - 100,000 17,014 17.05 15.60 15.19 4.24
100,001 - 200,000 22,823 22.87 14.65 14.26 3.92
200,001 - 500,000 27,440 27.50 13.81 13.39 3.67
500,001 - 3,000,000 20,363 20.41 12.45 12.15 3.35
Sector Primary 17,076 17.11 14.30 13.70 4.29
Secondary 42,775 42.87 14.53 14.01 4.17
Tertiary 39,924 40.01 14.27 13.73 4.01
Size Small 40,223 40.31 15.45 14.95 3.93
Large 59,552 59.69 13.67 13.07 4.11
SCORE Low Risk 25,684 25.74 13.95 13.32 4.28
Medium Risk 33,659 33.73 14.20 13.72 4.09
High Risk 40,432 40.52 14.82 14.3 4.02
Total 99,775 100.00 14.39 13.82 4.13
Note: Interest rates is winsorized for the top and bottom 1% of its distribution. We exclude loans above 3,000,000 euros, which
represent 2.5% of the loans in our sample. Primary sector includes primary, minerals’ extraction, chemicals, metals, energy. Sec-
ondary sector includes food and beverages, textile and clothing, wood, paper and publishing, mechanical and electronic machines,
production of transport vehicles, other manufacturing, and constructions. Tertiary sector includes commerce of transport vehicles,
other commerce, hotels and restaurants, transport, storing and communications, real estate, financial intermediaries, and public
administration. Size is defined as firms above or below the median of the distribution of yearly sales, which is around 10 million
euros. Low risk is for SCORE values between 1 and 4, medium risk between 5 and 6, and high risk 7 to 9.
Table 9: Descriptives Comparing Actual and Predicted Prices
Statistics Actual Price Predicted Price
Mean 16.594 16.592
Standard Deviation 2.579 2.579
10th Percentile 13.400 13.399
50th Percentile 16.500 16.500
90th Percentile 19.954 19.954
Correlation Coefficient 1.000∗∗∗
P-Value 0.000
Note: These are average prices at the year-province-bank level for the types’ default categories: 0-50,000 euros, primary sector,
small size, low risk.
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Table 10: Percentage of Predictions and Actual Amounts Granted in Thousands of Euros
Actual
Predicted 0 - 50 51 - 100 101 - 200 201 - 500 501 - 3,000 Total
0 - 50 2.6 1.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.72
51 - 100 23.7 18.6 10.9 4.5 1.2 10.19
101 - 200 63.3 65.8 66.6 59.6 40.0 59.90
201 - 500 10.4 13.9 22.1 35.8 58.2 29.08
501 - 3,000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.11
Total 5,667 11,222 15,580 17,301 9,268 59,038
Note: Each column sums up to 100%. The last column on the right represents the predicted total number of observations for each
mass point, whereas the last row represents the actual total number of observations for each mass point.
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B For Online Publication - Appendix B - IV First Stage and OLS vs IV
Second Stage
Table 11: IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second Stage for Demand
First Stage Second Stage
Variable Interest Rate OLS IV
Interest Rates in Other Markets -0.272∗∗∗ - -
(0.060)
Interest Rate - 0.220 -4.316∗
(0.234) (2.591)
Number of Branches 0.001 1.094∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.117) (0.143)
Share of Branches 0.046 0.152 0.314
(0.034) (0.367) (0.416)
Years in Market 0.021∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.073) (0.096)
Constant 1.024∗∗∗ -5.452∗∗∗ -1.734
(0.048) (0.250) (2.102)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,989 1,989 1,989
R2 0.6638 0.8386 -
F-Stat 18.313 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ is significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ ∗ ∗ at the 1% level.
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Table 12: IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second Stage for Loan Use
First Stage Second Stage
Variable Interest Rate OLS IV
Interest Rates in Other Markets -0.272∗∗∗ - -
(0.060)
Interest Rate - -0.131 -0.146
(0.128) (0.159)
Number of Branches 0.001 -0.033 -0.034
(0.012) (0.095) (0.100)
Share of Branches 0.046 0.117 0.120
(0.034) (0.224) (0.239)
Years in Market 0.021∗∗∗ -0.084∗ -0.084∗
(0.007) (0.044) (0.047)
Constant 1.024∗∗∗ 0.137 0.150
(0.048) (0.148) (0.166)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,989 1,989 1,989
R2 0.6638 0.0370 -
F-Stat 18.313 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ is significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ ∗ ∗ at the 1% level.
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Table 13: IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second Stage for Default
First Stage Second Stage
Variable Interest Rate OLS IV
Interest Rates in Other Markets -0.272∗∗∗ - -
(0.060)
Interest Rate - 0.008 5.599
(1.269) (11.587)
Number of Branches 0.001 0.178 0.167
(0.012) (0.673) (0.668)
Share of Branches 0.046 0.777 0.578
(0.034) (1.888) (2.010)
Years in Market 0.021∗∗∗ 0.380 0.297
(0.007) (0.409) (0.478)
Constant 1.024∗∗∗ -2.572∗∗ -7.154
(0.048) (1.258) (10.076)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,989 1,989 1,989
R2 0.6638 0.1160 -
F-Stat 18.313 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ is significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ ∗ ∗ at the 1% level.
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